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Releasing Managed Care's Chokehold on
Healthcare Providers
Kristin L. Jensen, J.D.*

I. INTRODUCTION

This discussion addresses the ways in which Managed Care
Organizations (MCOs) wield power over physicians and how this power
controls the content of treatment information provided to patients. MCOs'
practices inflict financial and professional harm on physicians, and patients
pay an unconscionable price because of these practices through reductions
in patient autonomy and quality of care.
Section II of this article explores the nature of the doctrine of informed
consent and its evolution in relation to how much and what kind of
information physicians are obligated to disclose to patients. Section III
covers the informed consent implications that have arisen with MCOs'
practice of limiting communications between physicians and patients.
Section IV highlights the ways that MCOs wield unfair bargaining power
over physicians and addresses the ways that the legislative and judicial
branches of government have failed to remedy this disparity at both the
federal and state levels. Section V of this article highlights the power of the
termination-without-cause clause and how MCOs strategically use it to
coerce physicians into complying with unwritten policies to restrict the flow
of information to patients. Finally, Section VI suggests methods to even
out the massive imbalance of power between MCOs and physicians and to
protect patients' rights to be fully informed of all treatment information.
These methods include enacting a ban on termination-without-cause
clauses, allowing physicians to bargain collectively, explicitly providing
physicians with a private right of action, and creating an impartial appeals
system to challenge terminations.

* Ms. Jensen graduated from the University of Houston Law School in May 2006. She is
currently practicing in Houston, Texas. She would like to thank William J. Winslade.
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II. INFORMED CONSENT AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

A. An Overview of the Doctrineof Informed Consent
Approximately one hundred years ago, in Justice Benjamin Cardozo's
New York courtroom, the concept of patient autonomy was born. 1 In the
frequently cited case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
Justice Cardozo announced that, "every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body."2 Informed consent is the legal embodiment of the concept that each
individual has the right to make decisions affecting his or her well-being.3
This doctrine, first described by a California appellate court in Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, states that a physician has
an obligation to disclose facts that are necessary for a patient to assess his
or her medical situation and to consent to treatment.4 Although narrow
exceptions exist, the general rule for informed consent is that a physician
must obtain the patient's consent prior to treatment.5
However, merely obtaining consent to a treatment or procedure is not
enough to fulfill a physician's obligation to a patient. In Rizzo v. Schiller,
the plaintiff alleged that her physician failed to obtain informed consent to
use forceps to deliver her baby, even though she signed an authorization
form before the delivery.6 The form did not apprise her specifically of any
procedures that the physician intended to perform, nor did it inform her of
any foreseeable risks or consequences of failing to perform any
This case illustrates the established principle that to obtain
procedures
informed consent, the physician must provide the patient with a clear and
honest explanation of all the factors that might affect the patient's treatment
decision, and that consent that is not informed amounts to no consent at all.8

1.
2.

Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
Id.

3.
Jon F. Merz, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Medical Informed Consent Doctrine:
Search for a "Standard" of Disclosure, available at http://www.piercelaw.edu/risk/vol2/

winter/merz. (last visited on Nov. 20, 2006).
4.
5.

317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
See 61 AM JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 157 (2006)

(noting that the theory of informed consent arises from a patient's right of self determination
and the fiduciary relationship between the patient and the physician).
6.

445 S.E.2d 153, 154 (Va. 1994).

7.

Id. at 155.

8.

See id. at 155-56.
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B. The Cause ofAction
Historically, the informed consent action was most often framed as an
action for battery. 9 The actionable conduct in a cause of action for battery
amounts to an "unconsented touching"; in that context, the patient does not
have to prove that he would have consented to the procedure if the doctor
had informed him properly.' 0 Today, however, informed consent actions
typically arise in conjunction with negligence in medical malpractice
claims. 1' The grounds usually are that although the patient gives consent,
the consent is inadequate because the physician did not disclose all the
relevant factors pertinent to the patient's decision.12 However, lack of
disclosure is not the same as misrepresentation. Healthcare providers who
misrepresent the risks associated with treatments13 can be held liable to the
patient on a theory of fraud or misrepresentation.
To fulfill the duty of disclosure, a physician must explain to the patient
all the risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment. 14 To determine
what information a physician must disclose to his patients, jurisdictions use
either an objective physician-based, objective patient-based, or subjective
patient-based standard of disclosure.' 5 A small majority of jurisdictions
adhere to the objective physician-based standard, which requires that the
physician disclose what a reasonably prudent physician would disclose
under similar circumstances. 6 Under this standard, expert medical
testimony is necessary to establish whether a physician has or has not
complied with the standard of a reasonably prudent physician. 7 Other
jurisdictions employ the objective patient-based standard, requiring that the
physician disclose all risks that a reasonable patient would consider
material in making a medical treatment decision.18 An extreme minority of
jurisdictions adheres to the subjective patient-based standard, which
requires the physician to disclose
9.
MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 202 (6th ed. 2003).
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
See, e.g., John P. Ludington, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Practice
Liability Based on Misrepresentationof the Nature andHazards of Treatment, 42 A.L.R.4th
543 (2006).
14.
HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 200-01.
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 201.
17.
Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind. 1992).
18.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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all information that a particular patient would consider material in making a
treatment decision.19
A patient may have a non-disclosure cause of action against a physician
if: 1) the patient's treatment carried with it an undisclosed risk; 2) the
physician's nondisclosure of that risk breached the applicable standard of
care owed to the patient; 3) the undisclosed risk materialized; and 4) the
20
physician's nondisclosure of the risk caused the patient's injury.
However, the patient must prove that his injuries were both physical and
behavioral, and must demonstrate that he would have made a different
treatment choice and avoided harm if he had proper disclosure.2 For this
element of causation, the courts use either an objective or a subjective test
to determine whether a patient would have refused the treatment if the
physician had made adequate disclosure. 22
In some states, legislation controls. For example, the Texas Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act ("the Act") determines which
risks and hazards related to medical care and surgical procedures that
healthcare providers must disclose to their patients or patients' guardians.2 3
The Act also establishes the general form and substance of disclosure.2 4 The
Texas Medical Disclosure Panel reviews medical treatments and surgical
procedures and prepares separate lists of procedures and treatments that do
and do not require disclosure.2 5 The panel also establishes the required
degree and form of disclosure. 6 If a physician adheres to what the panel
advises, then the physician creates a rebuttable presumption that he has
complied with the disclosure requirements; however, failure to disclose a
listed risk creates a rebuttable presumption of a negligent failure to conform
to the duty of disclosure. 27 Finally, if the panel's list does not provide
instruction on a certain treatment, then the physician applies the objective
patient-based standard discussed above.2 8

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 201.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 203-04.
TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.102 (Vernon 2006).
Id.
Id. § 74.103 (Vernon 2006).
Id.
Id. § 74.106 (Vernon 2006).
Id.
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C. Exceptions to the Duty to Disclose
Ordinarily, a physician is responsible for disclosing all risks associated
with treating a patient's condition. 29 The law, however, recognizes some
general exceptions to a physician's duty to obtain informed consent.3 ° For
example, a physician does not have to inform a patient of risks that are
considered common knowledge. 31 Also, a patient cannot recover if a
physician fails to disclose a risk already known to the patient.32
Additionally, an emergency exception to informed consent exists when a
patient is incapable of consenting, the potential harm from withholding
treatment outweighs the potential danger, and no family member is
available to consent.3 3 In some instances, a physician also may withhold
information if he feels that disclosing certain risks to a patient may present
a serious threat of psychological detriment to the patient and may
negatively affect his treatment.34 Finally, patients may waive their right to a
full disclosure by requesting that the physician not inform them of the risks
of a treatment.35
D. Modern Issues Concerningthe Duty to Disclose
Today, the physician's duty to disclose information has broadened
beyond the traditional requirements, encompassing a variety of modem
issues. Recently, questions have arisen involving the physician's duty to
disclose personal information that might impact the patient's decision to
consent to treatment.
For example, courts have addressed questions of whether physicians are
required to disclose to patients information regarding their own drug and
alcohol use,36 Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) status,37 and their experience and
29.
30.

Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1972).
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 722, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31.
HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 207.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.; but see Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 64 (Mass. 1999) (holding that the
emergency exception does not override a competent patient's lack of consent).
34.
Canterbury,464 F.2d at 789.
35.
Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 12.
36.
Compare Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 780-81
(Ga.2000) (holding no cause of action exists for a physician's failure to reveal drug use),
with Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a cause of
action exists for a physician's failure to reveal his alcohol abuse).
37.
K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn.1995) (holding that no claim
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qualifications. In Johnson v. Kokemoor, the court found that a physician's
experience regarding a procedure should be disclosed to the patient before
obtaining consent because it is an element that will help apprise the patient
of all the viable treatment options.38 In this case, the plaintiff sued her
physician after she suffered an aneurism and underwent surgery that left her
an incomplete quadriplegic. 39 When the patient had questioned her
physician about his experience, he responded that he had performed this
surgery "dozens of times"; in fact, the physician only had performed six
similar surgeries, and never one as large as the one the patient required.4 °
The court held that along with his personal experience, the physician should
have disclosed his risk statistics as compared to other surgeons who
performed the same surgery, as well as the availability of other more
capable medical care providers. 4' The plaintiff also was entitled to
introduce expert testimony to show that the defendant should have referred
the plaintiff to a care center with more extensive microsurgical facilities and
more experienced surgeons. 42
Another disclosure issue often brought before the courts is the
physician's duty to disclose any financial interests he may have in a
patient's care.4 3 This highly debated issue has been the subject of national
attention. 44 In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the
California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff stated a viable cause of action
by alleging that his physicians failed to disclose their personal financial and
research interests in his treatment.4 5 In this case, the defendants, a surgeon
and a genetics institute, used a leukemia patient's white blood cells to create
and patent a cell line.46 In addition, the surgeon and the institute retained
the patient's spleen, other blood, and tissue for testing purposes.47 The
court held that although informed consent questions typically occur when a
physician does not properly disclose all medical risks of a procedure, a
cause of action for informed consent also exists in situations when a
for negligent infliction of emotional distress exists when a patient seeks damages solely out
of the fear of contracting AIDS but had no exposure to the virus).
38.
545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wis. 1996).
39.
Id. at 499.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 498.
42.
Id. at 509.
Mark A. Hall, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished? The Theory and
43.
Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 222
(2002).
44.
Id.
45.
271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 147 (Cal. 1990).
46.
Id. at 148-49.
47.
Id.
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physician fails to disclose all personal research or economic interests
independent from the patient's health.48
In addition to financial interests in research, MCOs have created new
financial cost containment incentives that many believe should be disclosed
to patients prior to treatment. 49 To fully understand the importance of these
obstacles to informed consent, the modem landscape of health care in the
United States must first be understood.
III. THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE:
NEW OBSTACLES TO INFORMED CONSENT
Historically in the United States, patients paid physicians directly for
services on a fee-for-service basis. 50 However, medical technology has
become more sophisticated and expensive in the past thirty years, and
annual costs of the fee-for-service system have skyrocketed. 5' As a result,
payment for health care today is furnished largely through MCOs. In order
for a physician to treat and receive payment for his services, he must enlist
contractually with that patient's particular MCO.
MCOs are businesses characterized by different plans that consumers of
health care may purchase.
For example, in Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), "members are 'locked in' to the HMO provider
panel, meaning that health services are covered only if HMO members
receive care from the HMO's closed network of participating providers. 52
This "lock-in" feature distinguishes HMO models from Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs) and HMO "Point of Service" (POS) plans. 3 PPO
and POS plans do not restrict the delivery of care to a particular group of
providers, but they do provide enrollees with financial incentives, such as
reduced payment or increased benefit coverage, if they seek care from
participating in-network providers.54
48.

Id. at 150.

49.
Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining With Hippocrates: Managed Care and the
Doctor-PatientRelationship, 54 S.C. L. REV. 689, 690 (2003) (citing Frank A. Chevenak et
al., Responding to the Ethical Challenges Posed by the Business Tools of Managed Care in
the Practiceof Obstetrics and Gynecology, 175 AM. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 523

(1996)).
50.
See Alexander Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal
Implications of Changes in the Methods of PayingPhysicians,36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708,
712(1986).
51.
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "PatientProtection"Laws:
Incomplete Contracts,Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure,85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10
(1999).
52.
HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 932.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
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MCOs generally impose oversight on healthcare expenses to reduce the
instance of costly, and sometimes unnecessary, medical interventions. 5
This "oversight includes external controls on physician spending per patient
and internal financial incentives intended to bring the self-interest of
individual physicians in line with the fiscal goals of the MCO. ' '5 6 Some
examples of these cost containment controls include: 1) forms of base pay
from the MCO to the physician, including capitation, salary, and pay per
episode; 2) additional incentives, such as bonuses, withholds, and risk
pools; and 3) levels of incentives, for example, plan versus group versus
individual. 57 As Professor Grant Morris explains, "under the fee-for-service
system, the physician's fmancial interest was to order additional, and
perhaps unnecessary care, while under managed care, the physician's
financial interest is to order less, and perhaps deficient, care. 58
Following the lead of Moore, an argument has arisen that these
additional cost-containment factors are relevant to treatment decisions and
must be disclosed to patients so that they may make informed decisions
regarding treatment. Professor Morris supports this position and argues that
MCOs' self-serving financial incentives conflict with the physician's duty
of loyalty to the patient.5 9
However, several commentators have argued that disclosing these topics
to patients would be economically inefficient and would be both
burdensome and counterproductive to the practice of medicine. For
example, Professor Mark Hall argues that if an obligation to disclose
financial incentives exists at all, disclosure should be satisfied when a
patient first enrolls in a plan and periodically thereafter, regardless of
pending treatment decisions. 60 Professor Hall argues that when patients
enroll in managed care plans, they receive the benefit of their bargains, and
61
concede their right to information in exchange for cheaper health care.
Although this approach seems economically feasible, the language of the
Canterbury Court resonates loudly: "caveat emptor is not the norm for the
consumer of medical services. '62

55.
Hall, supra note 49, at 690.
56.
Id.
57.
Hall, supra note 43, at 225. A discussion of the intricacies of these various
types of cost containment mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper.
58.
Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure:Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ.
L. REv. 313, 347 (2002).
59.
Id. at 355.
60.
Hall, supra note 43, at 213.
61.
See id.
62.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol16/iss1/6

8

Jensen: Releasing Managed Care's Chokehold on Healthcare Providers

Releasing Managed Care's Chokehold

2007]

Advocating for a different approach, commentator Susan Wolf argues
that informed consent is no longer an issue only at the point of treatment;
patients need disclosure at every step of the process.63 Wolf asserts that
physicians should disclose whether treatment exists and if the patient is
eligible under the plan. 64
Therefore, the problem with managed care is that while it cuts costs and
increases the efficiency of health care, it also deprives healthcare consumers
of autonomy and compromises informed consent. After all, fidelity to the
patient's medical interest and restoring the patient's health should be placed
above all other interests, including any personal or financial interest of the
physician.65 As briefly illustrated above, widespread disagreement has
grown among commentators on the issue of if, when, and how this type of
information should be disclosed to consumers. However, contractual terms
that are designed by MCOs to prevent physicians from discussing treatment
options with patients have directly violated the doctrine of informed
consent and should be prohibited.
IV. OPPRESSIVE MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS

A. Onerous ContractualTerms
MCO-physician contracts are contracts of adhesion, written to enforce
the cost-containment policies that ultimately reinforce the MCO's bottom
line. Adhesion contracts are standardized, drafted by a party with superior
bargaining power, and offered to an adhering party on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. 66 MCO-physician contracts are standard forms written by the
MCO. 6 7 The MCO mandates all the contractual terms and the physician has
no opportunity to strike clauses or make any other adjustments. 68 For
example, when a group of anesthesiologists in New York attempted to
negotiate the terms of a contract with an Aetna managed care plan, Aetna
refused to negotiate the physician agreements and threatened to terminate
all of its agreements with the group's hospital if they did not sign the
contract in its original form.69
63.
Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed
Care, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 1631, 1639 (1999).
64.
See id.
65.
See Capron, supra note 50, at 710.
66.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).

67.

E. Douglass Baldridge, Physicians Versus Managed Care: Is It Time for

Physician Unions?, 28 N. Ky. L. REv. 65, 112 (2001).
Id.
68.
69.
Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., Inc., No. 95 CIV. 6631, 1996 WL
282069 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996), vacated by 107 F.3d 2 (N.Y. 2nd Cir. Han. 24, 1997),
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These standard form contracts contain onerous terms, which include: 1)
"hold-harmless" clauses used to decrease an MCO's liability; 2) "unilateral
amendment" clauses that allow MCOs to change contract terms by simply
notifying the physician; and 3) "penalty clauses" that allow an MCO to
refuse to reimburse a physician for providing an unauthorized treatment,
even if a patient needed it. 70 MCOs also often include clauses that assign
physicians an "independent contractor" status.7'
MCOs have the power to "control the means and manner" of a
physician's work performance. If an employer can "control and direct the
work of an individual, not only as to the result to be achieved, but also as to
the details by which that result is achieved," then an employer-employee
relationship exists.73 Therefore, whether physicians consider themselves to
be independent contractors or not, MCOs clearly treat them more like
employees, but without the benefits. One method of controlling the manner
of physicians' work is through "gag clauses," which MCOs have frequently
included in these contracts.74
B. Gag Clauses in Managed Care Contracts
The gag clause is the most well known example of how MCOs have
challenged the flow of information from physician to patient. Traditionally,
gag clauses were included in MCO-physician contracts to restrict the types
of information physicians could provide to patients, including: 1)
discussion of relevant medical interventions not covered under the plan
because of cost; 2) information about potentially helpful specialists outside
the approved provider; and 3) information about the economic incentives
offered to physicians for performing or ordering fewer and less costly
medical interventions.7 5
Although debate existed over whether MCO-physician contracts actually
contained gag clauses,76 MCOs justified the provisions on the grounds that
they protect proprietary information and are necessary to protect trade

aff'don reh'g, 152 F.3d (N.Y. 2nd Cir. May 5, 1998).
70.
Baldridge, supra note 67, at 113.
71.
Id. at 128.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. (citing Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
74.
Id. at 113.
75.
Gisela M. Munoz, et al., The Two Faces of Gag Provisions: Patients and
Physiciansin a Bind, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 249, 250-51 (1998).
76.
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/HEHS-97-175, MANAGED CARE:
EXPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO CONTRACTS, BUT PHYSICIAN
CONCERNS REMAIN (1997) [hereinafter GAO/HEHS-97-175]. In addition, the GAO
found no reported court cases that provide guidance on what constitutes a gag clause.
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secrets in a competitive managed care market. 7 However, gag clauses
prevent physicians from making required disclosures to their patients or
from referring patients to specialists.78 Professor Joan Krause explains that
these 9clauses allow MCOs to keep physicians quiet, and thereby keep costs
7

low.

The gag clause controversy centers on MCOs' explicit efforts to prevent
physicians from apprising patients of treatment options that might not be
8°

covered or that are covered but discouraged because of high cost.

Specifically, these limitations include: 1) requiring non-disclosure of
alternative treatment options; 2) bans on referring patients outside of
network without authorization; 3) pre-approval limitations; 4)
confidentiality clauses that prohibit physicians from disclosing proprietary
information, such as the plan's payment rates; and 5) anti-disparagement
clauses that prohibit physicians from "disparaging" the plan by making
statements that "could undermine the patient, employer, union, or public
confidence in the health plan" in any way.8 In this respect, informing a
patient that a potentially beneficial treatment exists but is unavailable
because it was not covered by their health plan could "undermine the
patient's confidence in the plan." Although not specifically designed to
restrict physician's clinical recommendations, these provisions prevent
physicians 82from discussing the merits of non-covered or expensive
treatments.

C. Legislative Response
In the 1990s, due to nationwide negative media attention, a full-scale
effort developed to prohibit gag clauses.83 These endeavors were for good
cause. With a gag clause in place, a physician cannot apprise a patient of
all his treatment options. Additionally, patients may not seek second
opinions and acquire withheld information because they would not be
aware of the withheld information. By including gag clauses in provider
contracts, MCOs not only control costs, but they also control the
substantive practice of medicine by commanding what a physician can or
cannot recommend to a patient.
77.
Munoz et al., supra note 75, at 252.
78.
Joan H. Krause, The Brief Life of the Gag Clause: Why Anti-Gag Legislation
Isn't Enough, 67 TENN. L. REv. 1, 10 (1999).
79.
Id.
80.
Julie A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and EthicalImplications of Gag
Clauses in PhysicianContracts, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 433-44 (1996).
81.
Id. at 443-45.
82.
Id. at 445-46.
83.
Id. at 472-77.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2007

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 16

In addition, beginning in 1996, Congress introduced a number of federal
bills confronting the problem of gag clauses in MCO-physician contracts.84
Unfortunately, none of the bills were enacted into law. 85 Some argue that,
although the bills were well-intended, none of them effectively addressed
the core issues of the debate: 1) the market's failure because of a lack of
information available to consumers prior to enrollment in an MCO, and 2)
the inability of patients to make informed healthcare decisions after
enrollment.86 In 1998, President Clinton banned the use of gag clauses by
HMOs that serve Medicare and Medicaid patients, created an Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Healthcare
Industry charged with developing a "Consumer Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities," and instructed his Cabinet to bring each Executive
agency into compliance with the Commission's recommendations.87
The gag clause also became a highly popular issue at the state level. By
the end of 1998, almost every state had at least one anti-gag law in place.
For example, section 1301.067 of the Texas Insurance Code prohibits an
insurer from interfering with a relationship between a patient and physician
or other healthcare provider and limits these types of communications."
V. THE TERMINATION-WITHOUT-CAUSE CLAUSE

Although the effort to outlaw gag clauses was laudable, it was an
ineffective quick fix. The fact remains that adding a third-party payor to the
equation introduces more complicated variables to the problem. Despite the
legislative response, powerful implicit incentives such as terminationwithout-cause clauses still exist, and MCOs continue to control and restrict
the dissemination of information to patients. In August 1997, the United
States General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report acknowledging
that "MCOs need not rely on written rules in their contracts to modify
physician behavior, but might use guidelines, protocols, physician profiling,
counseling, and other procedures." 89 Simply put, MCOs can maintain
unwritten policies that restrict discussion of treatment options by enforcing
the use of other less expensive treatments, denying coverage for some
treatments, and disciplining physicians for inefficiency. 90
84.
85.
86.
87.

Munoz et al., supra note 75, at 271-77.
Id.
Id. at 272.

88.
89.
90.

TEX. INS. CODE ANN.

See ADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROT. & QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE
INDUS., CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1997), available at http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/cborr.

§ 1301.067 (Vernon 2006).
GAO/HEHS-97-175, supra note 76.
Id.
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A. The Power of Termination-Without-Cause
MCO-physician contracts contain non-renewal options and terminationwithout-cause clauses that unilaterally grant an MCO the power to
terminate a physician prematurely and without cause. 91 MCOs "discipline"
physicians by threatening to terminate them for not following the MCO's
profit-maximizing policies. 92 MCOs have terminated physicians for
disclosing MCO policies to patients, for advocating for patients who's
MCOs have denied care, and for referring patients to specialists.93 If the
MCO has a large market share and has enrolled a significant percentage of a
physician's patient base, termination can be professionally and
economically devastating. 94 The termination-without-cause clause is the
most powerful weapon in the MCO arsenal because it aims directly at
physicians' wallets, inducing physicians to comply with MCO policies.95
The logical course of action for physicians who disagree with these clauses
would be either to negotiate for different terms or not to participate. 96
Negotiation, however, is often not an option, and non-participation means
the physician cannot treat his patients enrolled with that particular MCO.
Without another alternative, physicians must sign these contracts even
though the standard terms are incompatible with their interests.
B. Harms of Physician Termination
Physicians rely on MCO contracts for their patient base, income, and
marketability.
Accordingly, as physicians' reliance increases, their
incentive to consider cost in their practices also increases. 97
Cost
consideration does not stem from a sense of duty to the MCOs, but from the
fear of the personal and professional consequences of termination. 98 In
particular, two significant harms that impinge on the physician-patient
99
relationship emerge from termination.

91.
Bryan A. Liang, The Practical Utility of Gag Clause Legislation, 13 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 419, 420 (1998).
92.
John P. Little, Note, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the
Doctor-PatientRelationship and EndangeringPatient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1397,
1416 (1997).
93.
Id. at 1417.
94.
Id. at 1418.
95.
Id.
96.
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 151 (Aspen Law &
Business 2002).
97.
Richard S. Liner, Note & Comment, Physician Deselection: The Dynamics of a
New Threat to the Physician-PatientRelationship, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 511, 513 (1997).
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
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First, the ultimate financial threat to physicians is termination from an
MCO. Believing that full disclosure of information may lead to termination
from an MCO compromises physicians' abilities to make patient care their
primary concern. Physicians' abilities to determine courses of treatment
and make referral decisions based solely on their best medical judgment is
jeopardized when they think they could be terminated from an MCO for
economic reasons. The possibility of termination coerces physicians into
compliance with an MCO's unwritten policies that restrict the
dissemination of information to patients. This affects the quality of patient
care and compromises principles of true informed consent.
In fact, physician participants in a GAO study stated that terminationwithout-cause clauses provide strong incentives to restrict patient
communication, especially in regions where MCOs dominate the healthcare
marketplace. 100 Professor Joan Krause explains that if MCOs structure
financial incentives "correctly" from the MCOs' point of view, physicians
will internalize the incentive structure and impose their own restrictions on
interactions with patients. 10 1 These restrictions include providing less care
or less expensive care and spending the minimum amount of time with
patients. 102 Therefore, it is not difficult to see why and how MCO policies
Limiting patient
compromise patient information and autonomy.
interaction by discussing fewer treatment options or making no referrals to
out-of-network specialists serves the MCO's financial bottom line and may
keep the physician from being terminated. An effect of the without-cause
terminations is to coerce physicians to restrict care and terminate
noncompliant physicians. 03
Secondly, termination. can produce results similar to patient
abandonment.' °4 Patients of terminated physicians may not be able to
obtain a new physician in a timely manner. 10 5 If the patient is "expensive,"
has a terminal or chronic illness, or is elderly, then he or she is undesirable
for a new physician because high acuity level patients will have an adverse
effect on the physician's outcomes profile.10 6 Additionally, new physicians
and patients also accrue time and monetary costs associated with recounting
the patient's past history, physical exams, previous testing, previous
10 7
therapies and their results, and previous medications and their effects.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

GAO/HEHS-97-175, supra note 76.
Krause, supra note 78, at 15.
Id.
Little, supra note 92, at 1443.
Liner, supra note 97, at 528.
Liang, supra note 91, at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 419-20.
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Additionally, the patient must now establish confidence and trust in the new
physician and staff. Therefore, termination of a physician produces adverse
effects that could prevent a patient from receiving adequate care and the
patient may feel abandoned if obtaining a new physician proves to be
difficult.
C. Court Cases Evaluating Physician Termination
The courts have supplied limited recourse for terminated physicians. In
some states, physicians may challenge termination on the grounds that it is
contrary to public policy or that the termination denied the physician fair
procedure. 10 8 In Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc., the New
Hampshire Supreme Court allowed a physician to challenge termination on
the ground that it violated public policy. 10 9 The Court reasoned that the
relationship between physicians and HMOs affects patients' interests so
substantially that public policy and fundamental fairness require that a
decision to terminate a provider must "comport with the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing inherent in all contracts, and may not be made for a
reason that is contrary to public policy."'1 10
In Harper,Dr. Harper was a participating physician for Healthsource for
ten years, and thirty to forty percent of his patients were enrolled with
Healthsource. 11 After he "realized Healthsource was.., manipulating and
skewing the records of treatment he had provided to several of his patients
and that those inaccuracies adversely affected subsequent reports," he
notified Healthsource about his concerns. 12 Healthsource responded by
informing him that they were terminating his contract. 13 The court did not
prohibit termination-without-cause clauses in provider contracts per se, but
it held that in order to comply with public policy, HMOs must provide a
terminated physician with a decisional review.1 14 Relying on American
Jurisprudence, the court declared that "an agreement is against public
policy if it is injurious to the interests of the public, contravenes some
established interest of society, violates some public statute, is against good
morals, tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety, or, as it is
sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests of society and is in conflict
with the morals of the time."' 5 However, the Harper decision provides
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 419.
674 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id. at 966.
Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 965 (N.H. 1996).
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little guidance for the determination of what behavior will infringe on the
public policy construction because the court never defined what
circumstances surrounding a physician's termination would violate public
policy or the covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
Similarly, in Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court of California ruled that even if a contract permits terminationwithout-cause, MCOs are required to afford physicians fair procedure,
including notice and an opportunity to respond, and to ensure that the
termination is not arbitrary or does not violate public policy. 116 The court
held that a terminated physician has a common law right to fair procedure if
the insurer possesses power substantial enough to impair the physician's
ability to practice his specialty in a particular geographic area, thereby
affecting an important economic interest. 17 This decision characterizes
MCOs as powerful economic entities taking on a "quasi-public
significance," requiring them to afford the same level of due process as
other state actors. This was an important step in helping 8to adjust the
massive imbalance of power between physicians and MCOs."1
Furthermore, a physician's conflict of whether to disclose other
treatments for patients or to keep his job may present him with a lose-lose
situation. A recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
held that patients do not have the option to sue their health plans if they are
injured because the plan denied coverage for care, increasing the risk that
patients will sue their physicians if a recommended test or treatment is not
offered.11 9
D. The State of the Law in Texas
Unfortunately, Texas has not followed the lead of either New Hampshire
or California. Texas law fails to provide physicians with a private right of
action against MCOs. In Texas Medical Ass 'n v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,
the plaintiffs were a group of physicians whose PPO contracts were
These physicians sought to have the
terminated without cause.1 20
termination-without-cause clauses in their contracts deemed as void and
unenforceable. The plaintiffs claimed that the clauses violated Texas
statutes because the were not granted due process upon termination, and the
clauses required PPO contracts to be based solely on economic, quality, and

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

997 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 2000).
Id.at 1161.
Liner, supra note 97, at 521.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
80 F.3d 153, 154 (5th Cir. Tex. 1996).
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accessibility considerations.' 2 1 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the MCO because Texas statutes do
122
not provide private rights of action for enforcement of PPO rules.
Despite the use of the term "any person" in the statute, Texas courts have
limited those who may sue under the Insurance Code to either an insured or
a beneficiary of a policy. 123 Thus, without reaching the merits of
termination under these clauses, the court held that
the aggrieved physicians
124
had no cause of action and dismissed their suit.
As a result of this litigation, the Texas legislature has enacted a series of
piecemeal regulations designed to provide terminated physicians with
procedural protections. 125 Although these laws require MCOs to allow a
hearing by the advisory panel to review the termination, the decision of the
advisory panel is not binding and the MCOs are not required to state why
they did or did not accept the panel's recommendation. 26 Also, the
terminated physician is not allowed to be present at the hearing or to have
legal representation.127 Consequently, physicians may be terminated
without cause if they do not cooperate extensively with both the written and
unwritten policies of MCOs.
Some might argue that since the gag clause controversy, the market has
regulated itself because Texas MCOs must answer to the Texas Insurance
Commissioner. However, consider the following hypothetical where the
market does not regulate itself in the way that some believe it should: Dr.
Jones, an orthopedic surgeon, is feeling the financial strain of the managed
care revolution. Accordingly, he decides to take matters into his own hands
and performs procedures on his PPO patients in an out-of-network
ambulatory surgical center, rather than in a hospital setting. As long as the
center is out-of-network, he will continue to operate on his HMO patients in
a traditional hospital.
In his center, Dr. Jones' patients receive
comprehensive, efficient care in a sterile outpatient environment. This
reduces the risk of hospital-based infection and the hassles of a hospital
visit. In fact, a new report says that in 2004, in Pennsylvania alone,
hospitals billed Medicare an extra $1 billion to treat hospital-acquired

121.
Id. at 155, 157.
122.
Id. at 160.
123.
Levinthal v. Kelsey Seybold Clinic, P.A., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2824, at *5
(Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. May 29, 1997).
124.
Bryan A. Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for
MaintainingPatient-PhysicianRelationships in an Era of Managed Care?, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 799, 809 (1997).
125.
28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 3.3703, 3.3706, 11.1601 (West 2005).
126.
28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 3.3706(d)(3) (West 2005).
127.
Id.
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infections in 7,870 patients, and Medicaid was billed $371.6 million more
for 1,028 patients.12 8 The advantage to Dr. Jones is that he can operate outof-network and can regain some of his lost fees in a healthcare market
where he is continuously being paid less and less for his services. Dr. Jones
also can set his own surgical schedule instead of adhering to the hospital's
very strict time slots. Although Dr. Jones' practice is legitimate, the MCO
terminates Dr. Jones' contract under the without-cause clause because
referring patients to the out-of-network ambulatory surgery center, instead
of to an in-network hospital, costs the MCO more money. 129 Anti-gag rules
and patient choice laws are supposed to protect against this kind of arbitrary
termination, but they do not. To avoid termination, Dr. Jones likely would
have to comply with the MCO's unwritten policies to save costs by not
referring out-of-network, thus denying his patients information on all viable
treatment options, as well the right to give informed consent.
Arguably, this MCO is engaged in a possible deceptive trade practice by
selling a patient a premium policy that allows him to choose an out-ofnetwork physician, and then terminating the physician who referred him
out-of-network. Although situations similar to this are difficult to quantify,
more and more aggrieved surgeons are coming forward with this type of
problem. 130
VI. THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS
If we remain unwilling to surrender to Justice Cardozo's famous
declaration that the right of autonomy belongs to the patient, something
must be done to release managed care's chokehold on healthcare providers.
Both administrative and judicial remedies should be provided. MCOs must
be held responsible for their actions, and physicians need assurance that
they will not be terminated for fully protecting their patients' interests and
informing them of all viable treatment options.
1. One solution would be to lobby the legislature to enact a ban on
termination-without-cause clauses in physician contracts on the grounds
that they are unconscionable and against public policy. However, these
contracts usually state that the relationship of the physician to the MCO is
that of an independent contractor, and this recommendation might be met

128.
Nov.

17,

Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, PhiladelphiaInquirer,
2005,

available at http://www.healthleaders.com/news/newspage74770.html?

Contentid=74770.
129.
This hypothetical situation is intended to provide an example of a way in
which MCOs arbitrarily terminate physician contracts.
130.
Telephone Interview with Eric Gleichman, Vice President of Legal Services,
Foundation Surgical Affiliates (Nov. 7, 2005).
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with some resistance in states that are extremely supportive of the
employment-at-will doctrine.
2. Alternatively, in accordance with anti-trust laws, physicians should be
allowed to organize and form unions so that they may bargain collectively
to ensure that insurers treat them equally and fairly. Enforcement of
oppressive physician MCO contracts is unconscionable where the MCO has
such superior strength in bargaining. 1 31 Restoring bargaining power to
physicians via collective bargaining will allow physicians to renegotiate
onerous contract terms that have heretofore been non-negotiable, and it may
prevent some physicians from losing contracts with or being terminated by
MCOs. Collective bargaining by physicians will also benefit patients. As
we have seen, the interests of physicians and patients are aligned much
more closely with each other than with the interests of MCOs.
Furthermore, physician unions will cause MCOs to increase competition
with one another. One significant obstacle to this approach is that
physicians are often assigned an "independent contractor" status rather than
"employee" status. 132
Once physicians have some true bargaining power, MCOs will have to
be more competitive with one another in order to negotiate physician
contracts and to obtain the best quality and most efficient groups of
healthcare providers. These qualities will appeal to consumers who want to
pay the lowest premiums, but not sacrifice of quality of care.
3. Additionally, physicians should have a private right of action against
MCOs. Inadequately informed patients have standing to pursue a cause of
action against their physicians, but physicians have no right to sue MCOs
for preventing full disclosure of information. 133 Problems with this
approach are that litigation is costly, time-consuming, and diverts MCO
resources away from patient care. In addition, a physician may not have
standing to bring suit until he has been terminated for a time sufficient for
damages to accrue. Also, if physicians are granted a private right of action,
MCOs are likely to require an arbitration clause in their contracts. This
may lead to another type of contract of adhesion and may not help resolve
the underlying problem. However, in the presence of a neutral arbiter in
any case, an illegally terminated physician would have access to fair
procedure in the decision-making process.
4. State legislatures need to create an impartial appeals system for
physicians facing termination from MCO networks. Once a physician
receives notice of termination, a hearing should be held to resolve disputed
131.
132.
133.

Baldridge, supra note 67, at 111.
Id. at 128.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
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terminations. An impartial panel with the power to issue binding decisions
should conduct the hearing, and the panel must be agreeable to both the
physician and the MCO. Also, physicians should be given the right to
judicial review of unfavorable decisions. This will afford a physician a fair
opportunity to obtain an injunction against the termination, as well as a
court order addressing the practicality of onerous clauses in that particular
provider's contract. Importantly, an impartial appeals process would
provide a deterrent effect for arbitrary terminations, ensuring that MCOs
only terminate physicians for valid reasons.
5. A final possibility for aggrieved physicians is to file a class action suit
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
Following the lead of In re Managed Care Litigation, physicians may be
able to band together to obtain recourse from unfair terminations.134 The
Managed Care Litigation class action suit began in 1999 when a physician
sued Humana, CIGNA, and several other HMOs.135 The physician alleged
that health insurers used fraudulent marketing tactics and financial
incentives to restrict patient care, thereby breaching their obligations under
federal law to provide necessary medical care) 36 Within a year, a score of
patients and physicians filed other suits making similar allegations.13 7
CIGNA later settled with the physicians. 38 Although this is likely to be an
increasingly attractive option to physicians who are fed up with unfair
termination practices by MCOs, it primarily seeks to remedy the financial
harm suffered by physicians as a result of arbitrary terminations. Until a
class-action suit such as this is successful, patient information will remain
compromised.
These remedies are important because termination not only causes
physicians to lose patients and income, but termination also creates a
decrease in professional autonomy. Other MCOs are less likely to have an
interest in retaining a terminated physician, and they may eventually
terminate that physician without cause as well. Physician reputation and
marketability may further decrease
if the termination is reported to the
39
National Practitioner Data Bank. 1
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Some managed care proponents will likely argue that these proposals
amount to "doctor protections" rather than "patient protections." However,
the legal and public policy questions associated with termination transcend
a physician's jeopardized income and reputation. By giving physicians
recourse, it is not solely the physician that are being offered protection.
Importantly, this recourse also substantially shields the physician-patient
relationship and patients' rights to full access of information from
interference by MCOs.
VII. CONCLUSION
For now, the dynamic evolution of managed care continues. It is clear
that a healthcare crisis is currently unfolding in America and that costcontainment mechanisms are needed to prevent healthcare costs from
spiraling upwards, especially in light of today's aging population.
However, as long as healthcare providers face the threat of terminationwithout-cause clauses, the incentives that anti-gag clause legislation sought
to eliminate remain, the physician-patient relationship is compromised, and
patients are denied truly informed consent to health care. Until legislative
change occurs, physicians will continue to balance their traditional roles as
patient advocates and their new roles as business managers who must
control rising costs in order to avoid termination. This is precisely why
state legislatures should allow physicians to bargain collectively, explicitly
provide healthcare professionals with an impartial appeals system, and
provide physicians with a private right of action to challenge MCOs that
penalize them for engaging in patient advocacy. These are the only
acceptable ways of ensuring that physicians can be heard and not have their
profession derailed by unfair MCO tactics.
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